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ABSTRACT
This paper examines regional development in northern Quebec, Canada,
with a focus on the James Bay Cree, and makes some preliminary
comparisons with the Australian Aboriginal people in the Northern
Territory. The relationship between economic development and emergent
regional Aboriginal governments is a central concern. The paper
compares political, juridical, constitutional and cultural factors affecting
the organisational and economic resources available to Aboriginal people
in the two countries.
Even before the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement the Cree have enjoyed relative affluence when compared to
most Aboriginal people in Canada or in Australia. With rapid growth in
the Cree workforce, subsistence production is a stable but proportionally
declining contributor to incomes, while heavily subsidised growth in
Cree-controlled public administration and social services, and accelerated
entrepreneurial development, have been necessary to avert real economic
hardship. This growth has required constant vigilance and lobbying by the
Cree, who encounter substantial provincial and federal government
resistance to honouring some sections of their Aboriginal claims
settlement. Their efforts have not prevented increased unemployment and
declines in mean incomes in recent years. But without regional self-
government, the Cree would have fared much worse, and their chances of
meeting the very substantial demographic, environmental, and economic
challenges of current and coming decades would be even more tenuous.
This author's impression is that initiatives in Australia are to a greater
extent driven by central government policy than in Canada, where
Aboriginal organisations, like those in northern Quebec, have put state
authorities on the defensive in defining policy and constitutional agendas.
There are, however, a number of parallel trends in self-government
mobilisation by Australian Aborigines, particularly in the central and
northern regions. Regional organisations are assuming a more holistic
range of functions of governance, while consolidating Aboriginal control
of resources, and are beginning to exploit the attendant possibilities for
internal linkages in regional Aboriginal economies.
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Foreword
Dr Colin Scott was something of a windfall Visiting Fellow for the Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR). He had made
arrangements to visit the Department of Prehistory and Anthropology
prior to the establishment of CAEPR, but when he finalised arrangements
for his visit in 1991, it became clear that his research interests were as
much within the Centre's as the Department's ambit. He was in Australia
from June to August 1991, during which time he made a brief visit to the
Northern Territory and presented seminars in both the CAEPR and
Anthropology seminar series. Some of the material in this discussion
paper was presented in July 1991 at the seminar 'Aboriginal economies in
Northern Quebec: recent experience with development and the claims
settlements'.
Dr Scott completed this comparative discussion paper on his return to
Canada. He emphasises that the paper is both exploratory and
preliminary. This makes it extremely suitable for inclusion in the CAEPR
Discussion Paper Series. It also accords with the Centre's requirement
that Visiting Fellows provide some written output.
In sub-editing the paper for publication two minor stylistic changes have
been made that require explanation. First, the term 'aboriginal1 is
generally used in Canada in the dictionary sense of 'indigenous', and Dr
Scott used the lower case in his paper. This usage would have created
some confusion for an Australian readership familiar with the upper case
usage of the term to refer to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians. Consequently, the upper case is used throughout this paper,
although it is noteworthy that in Canada the all-encompassing term
'Canadian Aboriginals' includes 'status' or registered Indians, non-status
Indians and Metis, and Inuit. Dr Scott's use of the adjectival 'Aboriginals'
is maintained throughout, except when reference is made to Australian
Aborigines. Second, dollar amounts refer to Australian and Canadian
dollars. Wherever there is any possible confusion, $A refers to Australian
dollars and $C to Canadian dollars.
Jon Altaian
Series Editor
August 1992

The aims of this paper are twofold. First, it seeks to provide a current
account of the experience of the Cree of James Bay, northern Quebec,
concerning regional economic development under the 1975 James Bay
and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA). In the past, this case has
attracted international interest as one model for what may be achieved by
Aboriginal 'claimants' within the framework of a liberal democratic state.
The most recent comprehensive published data on the regional economy
(in Salisbury 1986) are now a decade old, and there is naturally some
interest in how the Cree are doing, fifteen years after 'settlement' of their
claims.
Second, this paper takes up, in a necessarily tentative way, the relevance
of the Cree example to the Australian context. While I have only a
novice's understanding of the Australian setting, its literature reveals both
striking similarities and differences with Canada. Australian specialists'
reflections and reactions in oral communication have made me
particularly sensitive to the differences and, I hope, suitably cautious
about extrapolating conclusions based on a Canadian region. At the same
time, reflection on differences has perhaps the greater potential for
suggesting new policy directions.
Particular attention is paid in this paper to regional development among
the Cree of James Bay in northern Quebec, and among Aborigines in the
Northern Territory, Australia. The JBNQA of 1975, and the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (henceforth ALRA)
represent the strongest recognition of Aboriginal rights in Canada and
Australia respectively, at least in those sub-state jurisdictions where
Aboriginal people are outnumbered by settler populations.1
Macro similarities
The experience of Aboriginal societies in Canada and Australia involves
many obvious parallels: the direct dispossession of most by European
'settler' societies; their encapsulation by British 'Dominions' that have
developed as liberal democracies; the numerical weakness of Aboriginal
populations; the fact that by most socioeconomic indicators they are the
most disadvantaged groups in society; their continuing cultural attachment
to the land; the substantial rurality or remoteness of their populations;
and the importance of Aboriginal rights as an issue to which both
Canadian and Australian Governments in the past two decades have
become politically sensitive, at both domestic and international levels. At
about the same time, policy-makers in both Canada and Australia were
recognising the bankruptcy of assimilationist policies, and bringing in
policies of recognition of Aboriginal claims as a key component in the
ongoing relationship between Aboriginal people and the nation-state.2
ALRA and the JBNQA were given effect at the same time, albeit via very
different processes at the level of state institutions.
There is little qualitative difference in the electoral strength of Aboriginal
populations in the two countries, so that in both Aboriginals' ability to
shape state policy depends heavily on extra-parliamentary political
strategies and sympathies. According to Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada projections (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) 1989:
5), there are now about 520,000 so-called 'status1 or registered Indians in
Canada, roughly 2 per cent of the total population.3 In addition, there are
some 25,000 Inuit, and perhaps a quarter million non-status Indians and
Metis (estimates vary widely). All told, people who identify culturally as
Aboriginal probably comprise around 3 per cent of the Canadian
population. Aborigines, including Torres Strait Islanders, comprised 1.5
per cent of Australia's population according to the 1986 Census, and
according to the preliminary count of the 1991 Census totalled 257,333, a
similar proportion of the total population (see Gaminiratne 1992).
In both countries, a combination of Aboriginal cultural preferences,
exclusion from mainstream political and economic institutions, and
central government policies has produced a growing non-urban
Aboriginal population that, contrary to assimilationist expectations of an
earlier era, shows no real tendency to integrate fully with the urban
'mainstream'. More than 60 per cent of registered Indians live in nearly
600 'reserve1 communities, and more than 60 per cent of these reserves
are in rural and remote parts of the country (INAC 1989: 14). The
average size of Indian reserve communities is slightly over 500 persons.
Patterns of population size and location in Canada, then, are somewhat
similar to those in Australia, where 42 per cent of Aborigines are
estimated to live in or around settlements or townships of less than 1,000
population (Australian Government 1987: 1). The proportion of
registered Indians in rural and remote regions has remained substantially
unchanged for the past twenty years, even as the population has doubled,
a growth rate not dissimilar to that of Aborigines in Australia
(Tesfaghiorghis 1991). The relatively economically depressed character
of most rural areas in both countries extends the parallel.
The employment rate in Canada among the working-age population who
identify as Aboriginal is about 45 per cent; but for registered Indians in
remote areas, the rate falls to 30 per cent. On reserves, 25 per cent of
working-age Indians are in full-time employment and 5 per cent in part-
time employment (Canadian Government 1989: 17), although it must be
remembered that in many rural and remote areas subsistence pursuits are
an important form of employment not reflected in these statistics. Again,
this picture is crudely comparable to an Australian Aboriginal
employment rate of 33 per cent (Tesfaghiorghis 1991: 19).4 Meanwhile,
the employment rate among non-Aboriginals of working age in both
countries is 63 per cent. Aboriginal mean incomes in both Canada and
Australia are, in general, about half the level of non-Aboriginal incomes.
In both countries, therefore, the impediments to sustained economic
development and employment equity are formidable. Economic
improvement will come through expanded access and accelerated growth
in (largely rural and remote) regional economies, or not at all. Yet these
are precisely the regional economies that have been bypassed by free
market forces, or distorted by the boom-bust cycles of 'single-industry'
resource extraction. And although Aboriginal settlements in rural areas
have sometimes retained or regained land bases, these are all too often
lands that have historically been ignored by non-Aboriginals precisely
because of limited economic potential.
Still, in recent years, one senses wide-ranging optimism on the part of
Canadian Aboriginal leaders at local, regional and national levels, and in
different areas of the country. The vision of economically self-sufficient,
self-governing First Nations is widely proclaimed. Vigorous
entrepreneurial spirit and self-confidence are in evidence at native
development seminars, business conferences, and commercial fairs, not,
however, without some expression of frustration over political resistance,
at both provincial and federal levels, to the demands of Aboriginal
governments for enhanced jurisdictions and resource bases.
My preliminary impression is that Australian academic observers and
analysts are more guarded about the prospects for Aboriginal economic
development than are their Canadian counterparts, even though the tone
of official government policy in Australia would seem more optimistic
than in Canada: no federal political party in Canada would commit to
Aboriginal 'employment equity1 by the year 2000, as the Australian
Government (1987) did in announcing its Aboriginal Employment
Development Policy (AEDP), with significant funding to back its
initiative.5 It is projected that by the end of the five-year period from
1987 to 1993, over $1.5 billion will be expended under AEDP (Altman
and Sanders 1991b: 12).
In contrast, the funding levels of federal Aboriginal economic
development programming in Canada do not inspire particular
confidence. The Government of Canada has promised to allocate $873.7
million to its Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy during the first
five years of the 1990s (Canadian Government 1989).6 It is not easy to
evaluate what this will mean in the final analysis, but here is one crude
measure: it has been estimated that in southern Canada it takes an input of
between $100,000 and $150,000 in government money to create one
permanent job. The costs are undoubtedly higher in remote areas, but let
us assume this is a valid figure. With $870 million, from 6,000 to 8,000
jobs at best could be created over the five-year cycle. But during eight
recent years, from 1982 to 1989, the average number of status Indians on
social assistance or welfare increased by about 18,000, from 39,000 to
57,000, according to INAC (1989: 55) figures.7 In other words, the
federal promise, even if it were all new money, could be expected, at
best, to forestall only half of the probable increase in welfare dependency
among status Indians alone, given current trends, not to mention Inuit,
non-status Indians, and Metis.8
Many Aboriginal groups attach their strongest hopes for economic
improvement not on government programming, but on development of
resources on reserves or other traditional land bases, bolstered by
settlement of their Aboriginal and treaty claims. There are more than
thirty 'comprehensive' claims under way in Canada, covering the
majority of the land masses of the Yukon Territory, Northwest
Territories, British Columbia, Quebec, and substantial tracts of several
other provinces. These cover territories over which the Crown does not
claim to have extinguished Aboriginal rights by treaty. Only three of
these comprehensive claims have so far been settled. There are, in
addition, as many as 300 smaller, 'specific' claims relating to post-
Confederation (1867) treaties, and perhaps a hundred more relating to
pre-Confederation treaties.
But do even the modern claims settlements in Canada warrant optimism
about self-determined, sustained economic development? The Quebec
Cree and Inuit have had some important successes in using their
agreements to obtain benefits unforeseen by Ottawa at time of signing,
but there have also been significant failures in getting the assistance to
which governments have committed themselves in principle, but failed to
deliver. Ottawa is concerned whether the JBNQA model is affordable as a
general solution. The federal deficit currently stands at $370 billion,
double that of Australia on a per capita basis. A third of federal revenue
now goes on servicing the national debt. The cost of settling all 30
comprehensive claims and 300 to 400 specific claims could run into the
tens of billions. It will not be a finished process this decade, or next.
Hopes and rhetoric aside, one wonders whether the ethos of
entrepreneurial development espoused by Canadian Aboriginal leaders
and many of their social science observers is really rooted in any more
fertile soil than that in Aboriginal Australia.
Macro differences
Australian social scientists cite many of the same macro-structural
impediments to Aboriginal development as their Canadian counterparts,
but also cite macro-structural disadvantages that are absent or less severe
in Canada. There are important differences in 'policy culture' between
Canada and Australia. Development initiatives in Australia seem to be
directed more by government policy. However enlightened that policy has
sometimes been, there is the nagging concern about things getting done
'for' rather than "by1 Aboriginals. Moreover, there is the pervasive sense
that past gains are quite vulnerable to changes in government and to
policy reversals that are largely beyond the ability of Aboriginals to
control.
One has the sense that in Canada policy agendas have come to be driven to
a greater extent by regional, provincial and national Aboriginal
organisations. Federal government funding was an important stimulus in
the development of provincial and national Aboriginal organisations, and
remains an important source of revenue. Aboriginal organisations have
achieved a degree of effectiveness, however, that makes it difficult for
government to withdraw support without serious political costs to itself.
And the device of multi-year 'block-funding' agreements between
Aboriginal entities and federal and provincial governments has provided
some protection against the shorter-term political manipulations and
insecurities that can arise from fiscal dependency.
The constitutional and legal history of British North America and of
Canada in relation to Aboriginal peoples represents a major and well-
known contrast to Australia. Aboriginal and treaty rights, reaffirmed in
Canada's Constitution Act 1982, relate to a long history of nation-to-
nation dealings between Aboriginals and Europeans, and although in
many conjunctures these precedents have been sorely eroded, they have
also provided important opportunities for rebuilding relations between
Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian societies. Perhaps this history helps to
account for the relative receptivity of the Canadian public to Aboriginal
demands, particularly in view of the many broken treaties of the past.
Even mainstream conservatives who are not particularly sympathetic to
Aboriginal claims on humanistic grounds tend to be offended by the
notion that treaties and other agreements may be casually dishonoured.
Compensation for lands already alienated is part of any modern
comprehensive claim settlement in Canada, a principle arising out of
treaty and constitutional history, and one which provides an initial capital
base in the form of compensation funds, in addition to the possibility of
ongoing revenues from resource development. As Young (1991: 213)
notes, Australian claims settlements do not include the payment of
compensation monies, making Aboriginal communities more dependent
for capital on forms of resource exploitation which will generate
royalties, and limiting opportunities for those groups who do not have
commercially valuable mineral deposits on their lands.
The economic impact of land rights, according to Young (1991: 208),
depends on five factors: the control exerted by claimants over renewable
resource use, particularly of subsistence; whether land claims include
subsurface or just surface rights; whether cash compensation is paid; how
cash payments are invested/distributed; and the internal mechanisms for
managing compensation. To these, I would add a sixth factor: the extent
to which claims agreements establish or promote institutions of self-
government. Self-government for the Cree and Naskapi of northern
Quebec, to the extent it is established by legislation pursuant to a
comprehensive claims settlement, is a constitutionally protected right.9
The 'self-government1 component of claims negotiations in Canada leads
to customary funding for Aboriginal government jurisdictions (health and
social services, education, police and justice, and so on) that provides
insulation from central government policy shifts.
Partly because of constitutional histories, partly because of the greater
length of time that self-government has been on the political agendas of
Aboriginal organisations, and perhaps also for cultural reasons (in both
Aboriginal and mainstream populations), the development of regionally-
based Aboriginal government structures controlling a 'holistic' range of
portfolios, seems to be coming about more readily in parts of Canada
than in Australia.
The advantages of regional-scale Aboriginal governments for economic
development are clear. They enable greater coordination of development
strategies across communities, and more effective capture and
recirculation of multiple sources of income through contracting and other
policies. They also offer opportunities for breaking the stalemate of
dependency on external agencies, by providing investment and more
informed decision-making about larger economic projects. Without such
support, local communities are dependent on complex interventions by
non-Aboriginal government departments, funding agencies, and advisers;
'it is difficult, if not impossible, for the leaders of an Aboriginal
community, the prospective 'owners' or beneficiaries of a local
enterprise, to maintain their own position and interests or to control the
course of negotiations in such a complex situation' (Ellana et al. 1988:
261).
Cultural factors
Observers of Australian Aboriginal economies report that: a corporate
sense of community beyond narrowly kin-defined social networks (a pre-
requisite for effective self-government and local and regional
development planning) is typically absent; egalitarian social pressures to
share wealth immediately are thwarting capital accumulation and
entrepreneurial management strategies; Aboriginal enterprises and
administrative office tend to be exploited for the benefit of close kin (and
by non-Aboriginal managers); and, while non-Aboriginal governments
have encouraged 'self-management' in various forms, Aboriginal
collectivities have found it difficult to develop the institutional means for
taking charge of governmental functions.10
Even at the scale of individual settlements, the existence of 'community'
organisation and sentiment cannot be assumed (Smith 1989). There are
definite implications for the scope of economic initiatives that are
workable. Ellana et al. (1988: 258) observe that large projects are
especially likely to trigger intra-community tensions rooted in tribal and
linguistic heterogeneity, and in the status of traditional owners versus
non-owners with regard to land requirements.
Local community heterogeneity is magnified regionally. Nonetheless,
there are instances of regional political cohesion along cultural/linguistic
lines: the Pitjantjatjara Council, whose constituency spans adjacent
portions of South Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern
Territory, and the regional organisation of Torres Strait Islanders.
In Canada, the better-developed cases of regional Aboriginal government
tend to be among populations who view themselves as having cultural and
linguistic affinities, although these are not proof against inter-community
or kin-group rivalries. At the same time, First Nation governments have
experienced powerful pressures to 'trim' their constituencies to conform
to provincial or territorial boundaries, or to respond to particular
conflicts with outside developers, as with the Grand Council of the Crees
of Quebec.11
At one pole of the discourse on development, indigenous cultural survival
has been perceived as incompatible with the development of Aboriginal
administrative and commercial entities. Against this tendency, one may
cite well-known cases in the anthropological literature of indigenous
social relations serving as effective vehicles for economic development
(for example, Salisbury 1969). Canadian anthropologists and historians
are becoming increasingly critical of the view that social relations and
ideologies of egalitarian hunters have been in conflict with competitive
economic practice. Archival reconstructions are showing that nineteenth
century Aboriginal hunters in diverse areas of Canada often turned
quickly to compete effectively as farmers on the prairies, as commercial
traders and fishermen on the Northwest Coast, and as loggers and miners
on the Shield (Knight 1978; Carter 1990). These entrepreneurial
successes were typically resented and vigorously undermined, however,
by non-Aboriginal competitors, who enlisted the well-documented
assistance of federal politicians and bureaucrats to impose legal and
administrative restrictions in order to block access by Aboriginals to
natural resources, machinery, and other necessities, often on the pretext
that Aboriginals, lacking the civilised qualities of the European, must be
restricted to outmoded (and unprofitable) scales and techniques of
production before being allowed to graduate to modern technologies of
production, or that they must first be made employees of White
entrepreneurs to 'learn the ropes'. In other words, there is a strong case
for the economic responses of indigenous social relations on modern
reserves being primarily the result of official sanctions during the
formative phases of frontier economies.
Do policy goals of economic development interfere with the 'right' of
Aboriginals to engage in lifestyles that bear the aspect of 'poverty' in
European terms? The appropriate response to such questions must be
provided by Aboriginal people themselves, and only adequately
empowered Aboriginal organisations are capable of a practical response.
A growing sentiment among Aboriginals in Canada is that a viable
contemporary economic base is a prerequisite for cultural self-
determination, even where achieving such a base requires significant
adaptation to state politics and market economic rules.
The Quebec Cree model
If claims settlements, implemented through a regional definition of
Aboriginal government and development planning, represent a best hope
for economic self-sufficiency in Canada, how well is development under
the JBNQA working out in practice? I will focus mainly on the Cree, who
organised as a regional polity twenty years ago, in response to the
development plans of Hydro Quebec, a provincial crown corporation. It
is important to remember that the Quebec Cree represent one of the more
progressive cases in the country. At the opposite end of the spectrum are
groups like the Lubicon of northern Alberta, whose claims over the past
dozen years, or so, have encountered federal and provincial government
opposition that has sometimes been nothing short of punitive, aimed at
undermining resistance through planned disintegration of the community.
The presence of industrially significant resources, and the legal and
political potential for Aboriginal claimants to oppose these developments,
have been primary factors in determining which comprehensive claims
get priority in negotiations.
Economic impacts
In the early 1970s, when hydroelectric development plans were made
known, the Cree and Inuit were fundamentally hunting societies, with
supplementary seasonal employment, as well as welfare income
introduced after World War II, but very few permanent jobs.
Contemporary governments did not acknowledge Cree and Inuit title to
land. Any special rights to resources (confined to fur animals) were
viewed by central governments as exercisable strictly at the Crown's
discretion.
The 1975 agreement established different bundles of rights to three
separate categories of land: for Cree, 2,158 square miles and for Inuit,
3,250 square miles of Category I lands, held in 'fee simple1 by local
communities; 25,130 and 35,000 square miles of Category II lands to
which the Cree and Inuit, respectively, retained exclusive rights to
traditional resources; and the remainder of lands in Category III (over
two-thirds of traditional lands) to which preferential Cree and Inuit rights
to traditional resources are recognised. A general right of the Crown to
develop on Category II and III lands was established, but subject to an
important role for Cree and Inuit participation in environmental
assessment, and to various forms of compensation or replacement for
damaged lands and resources.
Cash compensation was $136.6 million for the Cree and $88.4 million for
the Inuit, paid out over 20 years. There was also, for Cree hunters, an
income security program. The cash benefits from this program are a
major support for Cree subsistence production, in the order of 2,000,000
Ibs. of bush food per annum, regionally.
A series of regional self-government entities were established by the
JBNQA: the Cree Regional Authority (CRA), the administrative side of
regional government which operates in tandem with the political and
executive functions of the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec
(GCCQ); the CRA's Board of Compensation, which administers
compensation monies; the Cree Board of Education; and the Cree Board
of Health and Social Services. Also pursuant to the JBNQA, the Cree-
Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, in place since 1984, provides a charter for band
governments within the region. Capital and operations and maintenance
'core' funding from provincial and federal governments sustain both
regional boards and band administrations, although the GCCQ/CRA
depend primarily on income from compensation fund investments for
their operations.
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The main change to the Cree regional economy since the signing of the
JBNQA has been the growth of employment in local and regional
administration and social services (Tables 1 and 2). This growth should
not be regarded solely as the outcome of the JBNQA, since there has been
important growth of expenditure by federal and provincial governments
in the infrastructure, local administration, and social services of several
northern regions in Canada since the late 1960s. At the same time, it is
clear that the self-governing structures defined by the JBNQA, and their
political effectiveness, have been very important in accelerating fiscal
inputs by Quebec and Canadian governments.
The development of local and regional Cree enterprises, as well as the
provision of non-commercial community facilities, such as hockey arenas
and community centres, have been boosted through investment of
compensation fund income and principal. Personal income from both
local and regional enterprises shows significant growth, but at a far lower
rate than income from administration and social services during the initial
decade. Over half the employees of the regional administrative and
commercial entities are Cree, as are the vast majority of employees in
local administrations and enterprises.
Table 1. Cree personal incomes, 1971 and 1981.
1971 1981
$,000 Percent $,000 Percent
Hunting
in cash (furs) 300 4 642 2
in kind (meat etc.) 3,864 57 5,700 20
Income Security Program 6,046 21
Total, hunting 4,164 61 12,388 43
Salaries
government, industry,
local business 1,580 23 14,891 52
Transfers
old age, family allowances 305 5 600 2
welfare 683 11 800 3
Total income 6,732 100 28,679 100
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Table 2. Cree labour force, 1971 and 1981.
1971 1981
Number Percent Number Percent
Dependents
under age 5
aged 5-14
over 65
Labour force
professional, managerial
white collar, sales
skilled manual
unskilled, full-time
part-time wages/hunting
hunting, full-time
domestic
unemployed, sick
in school, college, university
Total in labour force
Total population
1,008
1,704
222
14
29
83
215
365
600
1,100
170
262
2,838
5,772
0.5
1.0
3.0
7.5
12.9
21.1
38.8
6.0
9.2
100.0
947
2,365
319
209
238
117
254
453
899
1,110
328
362
3,970
7,600
5.3
6.0
2.9
6.4
11.4
22.7
27.9
8.3
9.1
100.0
Source: Salisbury (1986).
Intensive harvesting
The numbers of households ('beneficiary units') and of adult subsistence
producers supported by the Income Security Program for Cree Hunters
(ISP), have been stable for the past eight years. There have been, on
average, 1,825 adults in 1,187 beneficiary units during this period (see
Table 3b). But due to a declining birth rate, declining average age of
adult beneficiaries, and lower average number of children per household,
the total ISP population has declined from 3,623 to 3,188 during the same
eight years.
Meanwhile, the total Cree population has risen rapidly, so that the
percentage on ISP has dropped steadily from 52 per cent in 1977-78 to 30
per cent in 1989-90. From 1977-78 to 1989-90, the non-ISP population,
oriented primarily to wages, unemployment benefits or welfare, has more
than doubled, increasing from 3,374 to 7,494. Ninety-three per cent of
Cree beneficiaries of the JBNQA reside in the territory, up from 90 per
cent six years ago, so net out-migration has not increased. The increase in
the non-ISP working-age population must be accommodated in local and
regional administration, social services and commercial enterprises, or
yield unemployment.
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Cree on ISP spend an average of 189 days per adult per year in the bush.
Total person-days in ISP-supported hunting have stabilised very near a
350,000 day statutory limit, on which the Quebec Government insists,
following two upward revisions from the original 150,000 person-day
limit contemplated in the JBNQA (and greatly exceeded in the first year
of operations).
Average ISP benefits per adult on ISP are $7,149, so that a husband-wife
team engaged in harvesting together are drawing a cash income of over
$14,000 in ISP benefits, a roughly equivalent amount in estimated cash
replacement value of bush food harvested, plus other cash income from
seasonal wage employment, fur sales, family allowances and, in the case
of the elderly, old age pensions (see Table 4).
Table 3a. Participation in Income Security Program (ISP) for
Cree hunters.
Year
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
Average
1983-4 to
1989-90
Number
BUsa
695
979
887
901
838
874
929
1,122
1,205
1,205
1,176
1,180
1,194
1,217
1,193
1,196
ISP
population
n.d.
4,046
3,672
3,564
3,111
3,043
3,134
3,623
3,740
3,710
3,586
3,474
3,302
3,372
3,188
3,482
Total ISP of ISP of
Cree total Resident resident
population (percent) population (percent)
n.d.
6,348
7,046
7,036
7,390
7,684
8,060
8,764
9,028
9,336
9,828
9,777
10,288
10,448
10,682
n.d.
64
52
51
42
40
39
41
41
40 8,442
36 8,885
36 9,019
32 9,473
32 9,671
30 9,880
44
40
39
35
35
32
a. BU, 'beneficiary unit', is an administrative term for household.
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Table 3b. Participation in Income Security Program for Cree
hunters.
Year Adult
beneficiaries
Children
inBUs
Adult
days
harvesting
Average
days
perBU
Average
days
per adult
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
Average
n.d.
n.d.
1,482
1,478
1,353
1,348
1,443
1,730
1,860
1,874
1,843
1,839
1,815
1,845
1,796
1,839
n.d.
2,400
2,190
2,086
1,758
1,695
1,691
1,893
1,880
1,836
1,743
1,635
1,487
1,527
1,392
1,643
n.d.
261,715
261,285
265,835
244,948
271,048
284,725
338,017
351,356
349,578
345,592
343,794
345,690
340,393
344,541
345,849
n.d.
267
295
295
292
310
306
301
292
290
294
291
290
280
289
289
n.d.
n.d.
176
180
181
201
197
195
189
187
188
187
190
184
192
188
Source: Cree Hunters Income Security Board Annual Reports.
ISP now injects about $13 million dollars per year into the regional Cree
economy. From 1976 to 1990, the program contributed $127,550,004 in
direct benefits to hunters.
Wage earners and unemployed
The 1989 resident labour force stood at 3,814, 1,835 on ISP, 1,207 in
full-time jobs, and 880, or 22 per cent, unemployed or occasionally
employed (Table 5).12 This is close to the norm in Canadian Indian
communities, but is still more than double the Canadian unemployment
rate in the worst of economic times.
Population increase has been such that from 1982 to 1989, the number of
Crees in the labour force (defined as people in the 20-64 age range plus
youths 15-20 years of age not in school) nearly tripled. From 1990 to
1994, an estimated 918 people will come into the labour force, with 175
retirees. Job availability must increase threefold by 1994 to achieve full
employment. Needed are 360 additional new jobs per year, or a total of
1,800 by 1994, just to prevent today's unemployment rates from
worsening; nearly 400 additionaljobs per year are needed for the next
14
Table 4. Benefits paid under Income Security Program for
Cree hunters.
Year Total Total Average Average Average Average
benefits benefits /BU /BU /adult /adult
(real$) (1989-90$) ($) (1989-90$) ($) (1989-90$)
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
Total
1,965,716
4,887,720
4,931,577
5,271,449
5,120,687
6,013,076
7,341,276
9,522,085
10,821,044
11,436,660
11,574,303
11,703,173
11,955,363
12,165,556
12,840,319
5,007,182
11,958,097
11,188,955
11,038,335
9,840,906
10,554,464
11,589,298
13,461,425
14,055,161
14,077,833
13,673,143
13,285,328
13,018,841
12,709,374
12,840,319
2,828
4,993
5,560
5,851
6,111
6,880
7,902
8,487
8,980
9,491
9,842
9,918
10,013
9,996
10,763
7,205
12,215
12,614
12,251
11,743
12,076
12,475
11,998
11,664
11,683
11,627
11,259
10,904
10,443
10,763
n.d.
n.d.
3,328
3,567
3,785
4,461
5,088
5,504
5,818
6,103
6,280
6,364
6,587
6,594
7,149
n.d.
n.d.
7,550
7,468
7,273
7,830
8,031
7,781
7,557
7,512
7,419
7,224
7,173
6,889
7,149
127,550,004 178,298,661
Source: Cree Hunters Income SecurityBoard Annual Reports.
Table 5. Summary of changes in Cree labour force.
1983-84 1988-89 Increase
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Income security
Cree entities
Band admin.
Local enterprise
Other
Unemployed
1,641
304
257
216
56
349
58
11
9
8
2
12
1,835
447
350
296
60
826
48
12
9
8
2
22
194
143
93
80
4
477
12
47
36
37
7
137
Total 2,823 100 3,814 100 991 35
Source: LaRusic et al. (1990).
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decade to attain full employment. Since almost 38 per cent of the
population in Cree communities is under the age of fifteen, high rates of
job creation would be needed well beyond the year 2000 (LaRusic et al.
1990).
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the 'easy' job creation of the
first decade of JBNQA implementation is over. Of existing jobs, nearly
800, or 70 per cent, are in Cree local and regional governments, health,
education, social services entities, and the regional commercial and
industrial entities of the Cree. Only 25 per cent are in local enterprises.
Further expansion into subsistence is currently inhibited by the statutory
ceiling on payable days, and on ecological and resource management
grounds is an unlikely alternative for the number of adults to be
accommodated in the labour force in coming years. Even if government
funding for housing and infrastructure for a growing population were
secure, 'it is unlikely that construction would be able to employ more
people than in recent 'boom' years when significant community
infrastructure projects were carried out' (LaRusic et al. 1990: 17). Any
employment growth that comes, therefore, must come through enterprise
development at local and regional levels. Alternatives are expanded
welfare rolls, out-migration to questionable opportunities elsewhere or,
as a temporary solution, higher retention rates in the educational system.
Currently, only about 13 per cent of Cree income derives from local
enterprises, and another 4 per cent from the Crees' regional enterprises.13
With about $70 million annual personal income, most of it from quite
stable government sources, there is considerable room for improving
multipliers through business development at local and regional levels.
Certainly, reasonable growth in income from enterprises is evident, with
real five-year growth of 78 per cent and 94 per cent, respectively, for
regional and local enterprises (see Tables 6, 7 and 8). This is faster than
the rate of population growth, but not as rapid as increases in
unemployment (Table 5).
Cree investment and enterprise development
The Cree's compensation monies are held by the CRA Board of
Compensation. By 1990, it had received, $113 million in compensation
funds (CRA 1990). About two-thirds of these funds are in secure short-
and long-term securities, while 15 per cent are invested in Cree regional
enterprises. Return on total assets have been in the 7 to 10 per cent range
since the mid 1980s.
The regional enterprises of the Cree are managed by Cree Regional
Economic Enterprises Company (CREECO), a holding company.
Principal among the enterprises are Air Creebec and the Cree
Construction Company, usually both profit-generators. Each have annual
16
Table 6. Changes in Cree personal income ($).
Transfer payments
Income security
1983-84
5,439,286
10,376,356
1988-89
16,156,077
12,144,735
Five-year
change
10,716,791
1,768,379
Per cent
change
197
17
Cree Regional Govt
admin./services
enterprises
Band administration
Local enterprise
Other wage income
Other income
Total
7,955,545
1,029,901
7,697,641
3,829,948
1,301,366
1,142,133
38,772,176
17,333,132
2,274,642
12,614,823
9,244,154
1,623,480
766,144
72,157,187
9,377,587
1,244,741
4,917,182
5,414,206
322,114
(375,989)
33,385,011
118
121
64
141
25
-33
86
Table 7. Changes in Cree personal income (1983-84 $).
Transfer payments
Income security
1983-84
5,439,286
10,376,356
1988-89
12,994,494
9,768,132
Five-year
change
7,555,208
(608,224)
Per cent
change
139
-6
Cree Regional Govt
admin./services
enterprises
Band administration
Local enterprise
Other wage income
Other income
Total
7,955,545
1,029,901
7,697,641
3,829,948
1,301,366
1,142,133
38,772,176
13,941,211
1,829,517
10,146,228
7,435,166
1,305,781
616,217
58,036,747
5,985,666
799,617
2,448,587
3,605,218
4,415
(525,916)
19,264,571
75
78
32
94
0
-46
50
revenues in the order of $25-30 million. There have been successes and
failures, good years and bad.On assets of $38.4 million, CREECO has a
cumulative deficit of $10.3 million. Over half of this is attributed to a
loss last year by the air carrier, which encountered difficulties with
expansion into the northern Ontario market, requiring $6 million in
additional investment from the Board of Compensation to offset the loss
(CREECO 1990).
The Board of Compensation must balance financial management
considerations against the need to make business risk investments, as well
as allocations for community facilities. Due largely to pressure from local
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band councils for annual disbursements (both for community facilities
and local enterprise investment), the total capital of the Board of
Compensation has declined by 25 per cent over the past three years, a loss
in purchasing power of nearly 40 per cent when inflation is taken into
account. The Chairman is actively advocating higher reinvestment of
earnings. On the other hand, a too strict policy of capital conservation
would cripple the ability of the fund to respond to development needs. If
inflation averages 4 per cent per year, and population growth continues at
about 5 per cent, then the fund would need to reinvest virtually all
investment earnings if capital conserved is to keep pace relative to an
expanding population base (CRA 1990).
Table 8. Changes in Cree income per capita (1983-84 $).
1983-4 1988-9 Five-year Percent
change change
Transfer payments 716 1,430 715 100
Income security 1,365 1,075 (290) -21
Cree Regional Govt
admin./services 1,047 1,535 488 47
enterprises 136 201 66 49
Band administration 1,013 1,117 104 10
Local enterprise 504 818 314 62
Other wage income 171 144 (28) -16
Other income 150 68 (82) -55
Total 5,102 6,389 1,287 25
Source: LaRusic et al. (1990).
Amendments and additions to Hydro Quebec's engineering plans to
complete Phase I led to subsidiary agreements providing cash
compensation of a further $180 million. Of this, $112 million is held by a
new entity established in the mid-1980s, Eeyou Corporation. Eeyou
invests this sum conservatively on the securities market, but unlike the
Board of Compensation, it distributes all profits to communities suffering
the impact of the scheme, who decide for themselves the proportions to
be invested in community projects and services and enterprise
development.
Financial information on local enterprises, many of them private, is not
easily accessible. Service enterprises such as grocery stores, cafeterias,
lodging, vehicle service, and small motor sales have done well. More
ambitious schemes have included operations such as a bush plane charter
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service, and mini-hydro generation for local consumption. As yet, there
are few enterprises in primary or secondary industries. Two communities
are involved in forestry, another in a joint venture with Yamaha to
manufacture water craft for northern use, and yet another is involved in
domesticating lynx as a ranched fur. Results have been mixed.
Cultural factors in economic development
It is worth considering how Cree have been dealing with certain cultural
issues raised earlier. Social tensions do arise over private accumulation
and material differentiation, but these are mediated by the fact that in
communities where local and regional administrations control access to
investment funding and other opportunities, there is a political mechanism
for distributing opportunities relatively evenly.14 Accumulation per se is
not so much the issue, as having enough opportunities for everyone to
Vise' together. At the same time, it is tempting for band administrators to
support particularly successful entrepreneurs, as these not only provide
more reliable employment opportunities in the community, but are often
more able to attract funding from provincial and federal government
economic development programs.
As discussed elsewhere (Scott 1984), sharing through kin networks has
tended to level out differences between the relatively cash-rich
permanently employed, and the bush food-rich intensive hunters. All
households whose primary adaptation is cash income still have close kin
whose primary occupation is hunting.
Cultural priorities do shape patterns of labour allocation that are feasible
in business and employment development. Seasonal hunting, particularly
during socially and ritually important times on the land, requires
flexibility. Local development plans have had to take these requirements
into account.
Many Cree are very cautious about involving themselves in
entrepreneurial initiatives, perhaps not surprising given the special
difficulties and risks that business in a remote area can entail, and also
given experience in the 1960s and early 1970s of development projects
advocated by external government agencies that generally failed. It is
furthermore the case that many small business opportunities are not
attractive compared to the excellent incomes and conditions of work
attached to many administrative and other jobs with Cree entities in the
service sector. While expectations may have been inflated during the
initial years of JBNQA implementation and the period of easier job
creation, rising unemployment levels are inducing many Cree to take a
second look at entrepreneurial possibilities. The role of Cree government
resources in providing capital and reducing the risk to individuals is
important. Where more costly enterprises are concerned, local
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administrations, and many individuals, prefer to harness entrepreneurial
talent through management roles in band-owned businesses.
Obstacles to economic development
Several obstacles continue to restrict the extent to which Cree are able to
participate in the development of resources on their territory. Currently,
as is well known, there is major disagreement between the Cree and the
Government of Quebec over the wisdom of proceeding with Phases n and
III of hydroelectric development at James and southern Hudson Bays.
Cree predict damage to traditional harvesting activities on an
environmentally as well as socially unacceptable scale, and have had to
embark on numerous costly court actions to force the Governments of
Canada and Quebec to submit hydroelectric development to the
environmental review process negotiated as part of the JBNQA and
passed into provincial and federal statute. In other words, the Cree have
had to be vigilant in forcing non-Aboriginal governments to uphold their
own laws and agreements, and the financial and human resource cost of
this vigilance is onerous for a small Aboriginal administration.
Hydroelectricity is not the only development activity initiated by non-
Aboriginals that poses extensive threats to the traditional economy. In the
southerly parts of Cree territory, large-scale forestry operations,
involving extensive clear-cutting of many hunting areas, have become a
second major threat. Clear-cutting permits for reservoirs projected as
part of Phase III hydro development have been granted by the Quebec
government, and cutting was already under way in 1991, despite Cree
protests, well in advance of any environmental assessment and review.
These intrusions are particularly galling to the Cree, given the difficulties
they have experienced in obtaining control of resources for their own
enterprise development, and in gaining a voice in forest management
planning. Forestry concessions to large non-Aboriginal companies have
severely restricted the timber available to Cree forestry enterprises, and
cutting practices have typically proceeded with little adjustment to the
requirements of Cree hunters and other users of the land.
Federal and provincial governments have been non-cooperative in other
areas as well. Terms negotiated under the JBNQA, giving Cree the
primary opportunity to develop tourism and outfitting enterprises
supplying recreational hunters in the territory, were 'creatively
interpreted' by the Quebec Government in a calculated effort to sidestep
the Cree right and give freer rein to non-Aboriginal entrepreneurs in this
domain. Defence of Cree rights again required costly court actions.
A factor limiting Cree participation in some economic development
activity is the large amount of capital required to control certain kinds of
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enterprise. Hydroelectric, mining, and forestry operations are often on
such a scale. In some such areas, Cree have developed wholly-owned
specialty enterprises to serve a particular function within a larger
industrial process. In others, joint venture arrangements have been made.
Even when Cree capital is adequate to control certain large-scale
enterprises, non-Aboriginal political opposition remains an obstacle.
When Cree on two separate occasions successfully arranged financial bids
on large commercial airlines for sale in southern Quebec (Nordair and
Quebecair), provincial and federal cabinets collaborated to block the bids
from being successful, in one case, apparently, by assisting a competitor
to marginally undercut the Cree bid through the relay of confidential
information. In both cases, disbelief in the ability of the Cree to run a
large-scale enterprise, as well as Quebec nationalist sentiment over
control of the airlines, were at play. A provincial cabinet minister
remarked, 'Les Cris ne sont pas Quebecois [the Cree are not Quebecers]!'.
The episodes led Chief Billy Diamond to conclude that the Cree are
victims of 'white-collar apartheid' (MacGregor 1990: 249-54).
It is generally acknowledged that one of the weakest sections of the
JBNQA is that relating to economic development. Governments
committed themselves to general principles and objectives, rather than to
a precise schedule of inputs. In a climate of fiscal restraint, as
governments have baulked at the general level of expenditure required to
maintain the JBNQA, support has often been disappointing. Official
reviews of JBNQA performance have been critical of this departure from
the spirit and intent of the economic development provisions.
Notwithstanding formidable obstacles, the Cree have achieved a 'critical
mass' of resources and experience that make them a political organisation
to be reckoned with. Through their highly effective opposition over the
past few years to Phase II of Hydro Quebec's James/Hudson Bay
development plan, the Cree have demonstrated that their de facto control
of land and resources considerably exceeds the limited legal title which
the Governments of Quebec and Canada recognise under the JBNQA. It is
this quantum of political control over what happens in the territory that
could provide the basis for negotiating a strong position in an expanding
regional economy, but on terms environmentally acceptable to the Cree.
Reflections on the Northern Territory comparison
The challenges of Aboriginal economic development in Australia's central
and northern regions resemble those in the Canadian north. Physical and
environmental characteristics offer a relatively narrow range of
economically significant resources. Political economic structures have
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offered opportunities disproportionately to non-Aboriginal residents and
non-resident investors. Undercapitalisation, high overheads, the
difficulties of transport and communications, sparse populations, low
incomes of Aboriginal customers, and dependency on external support
agencies for development in Aboriginal communities have contributed to
high failure rates among Aboriginal enterprises (Young 1988).
In the Australian central and northern areas, as in the Canadian north,
public sector expenditure is the economic mainstay for both Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal populations.15 In neither case do royalties,
compensation monies, and title to lands and resources provide by
themselves a sufficient economic base for Aboriginal communities. A key
element of development strategy, then, must be for self-governing
institutions to directly administer the highest possible proportion of
resources from central government treasuries earmarked for Aboriginals.
Ideally, this should in time result in improved ratios of Aboriginal
employees in administration and social services, improved multipliers
through enhanced enterprise development in Aboriginal communities, and
increased effectiveness in creating and competing for new opportunities.
A regional comparison
Existing studies provide the basis for some crude comparison of regional
Aboriginal economies in northern Quebec and central Australia. Per
capita government expenditures attributed to Aboriginals in northern
Quebec, at $C 19,700, were substantially higher than those in central
Australia at $A11,700 in 1987-88, the only year for which we have
comparative data (Tables 9 and 10).16 Higher government expenditure in
northern Quebec, of course, cannot be taken as a straightforward
indication of a higher material standard in Cree communities. The larger
population in central Australia which enables certain economies of scale,
and a less severe climate should, for example, influence the amount and
proportion of per capita transfers required for general infrastructure.
The key structural difference is that a much higher proportion of
government expenditures remains under the control of federal, state and
territorial 'mainstream' departments in central Australia. Cree local and
regional government entities administer block budgets for education,
health and social services, housing and administration, transferred
annually from federal and provincial government treasuries.
The multipliers of these inputs have no doubt assisted the growth of local
and regional enterprises noted earlier, but as LaRusic et al. (1990: 22)
conclude, the development of the commercial sector has scarcely begun to
harvest the potential for turning over money in Cree communities. More
established non-Aboriginal enterprises, headquartered south of the Cree
region, are beneficiaries of much of the opportunity for recirculation and
wealth creation.
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Table 9. Government expenditures attributable to Aborigines
in Central Australia, 1987-88 ($m).a
Grants/subsidies based on 'Aboriginality'b 46,374
Citizenship entitlements
Dept of Social Security 26,929
Community Development Employment Projects scheme0 16,601
Local Government grants 4,096
Mainstream department spending** 55,572
Total 103,198
Administration costs of
state Aboriginal bureaucracy 2,188
Total 151,760
a. Includes federal and territorial governments.
b. From the federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Aboriginal Development
Commission, Department of Employment, Education and Training; and Aboriginals
Benefit Trust Account.
c. Monies made in lieu of unemployment benefits.
d. Includes the Northern Territory Department of Health and Community Services, and
the Northern Territory Department of Education, as well as several other 'mainstream'
departments. South Australian and Western Australian Government components were
estimated.
Source: Crough et al. (1989).
This finding is consistent with a comparison of Aboriginal personal
incomes (Tables 11 and 12). While per capita cash incomes are
appreciably higher in northern Quebec than in central Australia ($C7,900
and $A4,700 respectively), it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that the
difference in income is just proportional to the difference in government
expenditures on Aborigines, which might suggest that the Cree economy
has not yet been more effective in recirculating revenues from central
governments. The contexts in which multipliers result in employment
opportunities for Aborigines do, of course, differ in important respects.
Aborigines in central Australia, who comprise about one-third of the
population, have greater employment involvement with non-Aboriginal
enterprises, in centres such as Alice Springs, than do Cree. In the
Northern Territory as a whole, 51 per cent of Aboriginal jobs were in
the private sector, although many so defined in the census were with
Aboriginal organisations (Altman and Daly 1992: 17). This can be
compared with 31 per cent in the Cree region, where non-Aboriginals are
a tiny minority of the permanent population. The nine Cree communities
range in size from 500 to 2,500 in population, in a territory the size of
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France. Only two of them have ready access to the employment markets
of larger non-Aboriginal towns, on the southern edge of this territory.
Table 10. Government expenditures attributable to Aboriginals
in Northern Quebec, 1987-88 ($m).
Government of Quebec
Hydro Quebec
Ministry of Municipal
Affairs
Ministry of Education3
Ministry of Health
and Social Services
Hunters' ISP
Ministry of Housing
Other
Total, Quebec
Government of Canada
Department of Indian Affairs
housing & community
infrastructure
local government
education
development
other
Central Mortgage and
Housing
Department of Regional
Industrial Expansion
Secretary of State
Employment and Immigra-
tion Canada
Transport Canada
Other
Total, Canada
Total, Canada
and Quebec
Cree
16,827
11,731
16,708
16,175
5,659
67,100
23,200
382
1,944
6,791
29
532
32,878
99,978
Inuit
2,010
19,065
23,964
23,656
42,302
27,803
138,800
8,000
7,300
765
247
6,541
3,291
5,000
530
31,674
170,474
Naskapi
205
403
2,066
576
3,250
1,300
66
588
29
1,983
5,233
Ethnicity
not
specified
7,391
14,130
3,082
87
3,091
4,100
1,331
33,212
33,212
Total
19,042
19,065
36,098
42,430
16,175
42,302
34,038
209,150
15,391
14,130
31,800
4,295
2,191
13,920
3,407
3,091
4,100
5,000
2,422
99,747
308,897
a. Excludes federal education transfers paid through province.
Sources: Canadian government: Annual Report of the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement/Northeastern Quebec Agreement (1988); Quebec Government: Secretariat aux
Affaires Autochtones, Raymond-M. Gagnon (1989).
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Table 11. Aboriginal personal cash income, Central Australia
(1987-88).
$m Per cent
Transfer paymentsa
Dept of Social Security (DSS) 29,929
Community Development Employment
Projects scheme (CDEP) wages 12,254
Total transfer payments 42,183 70
Wages
Aboriginal bureaucracy
of central govts 414
Aboriginal organizations 6,730
other 10,930
Total wages 18,074 30
Total personal income 60,257 100
a. DSS benefits include unemployment, family allowance, old age and other benefits.
CDEP wages are an unemployment benefit replacement.
Source: Crough et al. (1989).
Rates of employment in the formal economic sector, as well as
unemployment, are quite similar for James Bay and central Australia
(Table 13). As with the Cree, Aboriginal employment in central Australia
centres heavily on public administration and community services (Crough
et al. 1989: 20). The most striking difference is the percentage of central
Australian Aborigines not in the labour force.17 In the Cree region, ISP-
supported hunting is considered a form of employment, and ISP hunters
are included in the labour force. Very high rates of non-labour force
involvement in central Australia mask significant engagement in
subsistence and other traditional activities. CDEP scheme block funds,
which allow communities to define for themselves which work is
remunerable, provide support at some outstations for such activities.
Altman and Taylor (1989) argue that a guaranteed income for outstations
in support of subsistence activities could support high rates of
employment in many areas. This income, in turn, could foster certain
Aboriginal enterprises to service outstations and other rural populations.
A true picture of Aboriginal incomes, in both central Australia and
northern Quebec, must take account of subsistence production. Here the
grounds for comparison are even more impressionistic. If Cree annual
bush food harvests have stabilised in absolute terms at the two million
pounds reported a decade ago (James Bay and Northern Quebec Native
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Harvesting Research Committee 1982), then $9 million in 1988-89
replacement value is a reasonable estimate, or 11 per cent of total Cree
income, when added to cash income shown in Table 12. Although a
constant and crucial contributor to diets and incomes, the proportional
contribution of subsistence product to incomes has declined steadily from
levels of 'in kind1 contributions to income of 57 per cent in 1971 and 20
per cent in 1981 (Table 1).
Table 12. Cree personal cash income, Northern Quebec (1988-
89).
$ m Per cent
Transfer payments
Income Security Program 12,145
other transfer payments3 16,156
Total transfer payments 28,301 39
Wages
Cree Regional Govt
admin./services 17,333
enterprises 2,275
Band administration 12,615
Local enterprise 9,244
Other wage income 1,623
Total wages 43,090 60
Other income 766 1
Total personal income 72,157 100
a.Transfer payments include welfare, unemployment insurance, family allowance,
pension and old age security benefits.
Source: LaRusic et al. (1990).
Increases in salaries and direct transfers, enabled by large increases in
government spending on Aboriginals in northern Quebec since the early
1970s, only partly compensated for proportional declines in the
contribution of subsistence to the personal incomes of a rapidly growing
population. According to Simard's (1992) compilation of earlier studies,
the years following the signing of the JBNQA saw a decline in Cree and
Inuit per capita incomes relative to incomes in Quebec, the Yukon and
Northwest Territories, and Canada at large (Table 14). With subsistence
production taken into account, income tax exempt status, and substantially
larger families, Cree and Inuit family incomes exceeded the Canadian
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average, both before and after the implementation of the JBNQA, but by
a steadily decreasing margin (Table 15).18
Table 13. Aboriginal labour force status, Central Australia and
James Bay Cree.
Central Australia James Bay
1986 (per cent) 1988 (per cent)
Employed 25.7
Unemployed 17.1 15.4
Hunters' ISP 34.2
Not in labour force 50.5 28.8
Not stated 6.5
Sources: Central Australia, Crough et al. (1989); James Bay, LaRusic et al. (1990).
Table 14. Per capita disposable income for Cree, Inuit and
other regions in Canada for selected years 1970-838.
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1976
1981
1983
Cree
($)
1,902
2,151
2,384
5,072
Jiiuit
($)
2,970
4,625
5,883
6,202
Quebec
($)
2,385
2,593
2,955
3,361
5,217
8,889
10,168
Yukon and
NWT*
($)
2,700
2,669
2,940
3,339
5,078
9,729
11,102
Canada
($)
2,611
2,835
3,204
3,709
5,577
9,764
11,135
a. Cash and imputed subsistence incomes combined for Cree and Inuit.
b. North West Territories.
Source: Simard (1992), compiled from multiple sources.
In the Northern Territory, subsistence production accounts for
significantly higher incomes at outstation communities than at Aboriginal
townships (Fisk 1985: 63). Taylor (1991: 25) finds that 'the proportion of
outstation males in higher income brackets compares surprisingly well
with males in the rest of the Northern Territory1 in 1991, an intriguing
27
Table 15. Disposable family incomes for Cree, Inuit and all
Canadians for selected years 1971-83a.
Year
1971
1972
1973
1976
1981
1983
Cree
($)
11,851
13,227
27,705
Inuit
($)
16,009
24,405
29,458
32,234
Canada
($)
7,972
8,957
9,902
14,079
23,736
26,394
a. Cash and imputed subsistence incomes combined for Cree and Inuit.
Source: Simard (1992), compiled from multiple sources.
observation when one considers that the median individual cash income of
Aborigines was only 39 per cent of the non-Aboriginal median in the
1986 Census, a lower ratio of Aboriginal to non-Aboriginal median cash
income in the Northern Territory than in any of the States
(Tesfaghiorghis 1991: 19). The 'locational disadvantage' (Altman 1990,
Tesfaghiorghis and Gray 1991) of rural and remote Aboriginal
communities, without disproportionate inputs of public resources, may
sometimes be converted to net advantage in the context of subsistence
opportunities.
In the Top End, annual replacement value of bush food at Momega
outstation has been estimated at $1,411 and $747 per capita for 1979-80,
depending on whether urban or outstation replacement prices are used
(Altman 1987: 56; Fisk 1985: 23). Based on data collected three years
after Altman's Momega study, subsistence income at desert outstations
was estimated at a lower value of $616 per capita per year (Cane and
Stanley 1985: 197). However, Palmer and Brady's study (1991)
challenges the idea that subsistence is necessarily a greater contributor in
the Top End than in the desert.
Subsistence values in northern Quebec, for broad regional populations,
were calculated by Salisbury at $750 per capita income 'in kind' for Cree
in 1981 (Table 1), and by Duhaime (1987) at $1,763 per capita for Inuit.
Outstation values do not provide a comparable picture of subsistence
contributions to overall regional economies in Australia. Taylor (1991:
11) estimates a minimum of 5,474 Aborigines residing at outstations in
the Northern Territory based on the 1986 Census. While many other
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Aborigines are doubtless substantially less engaged in subsistence pursuits,
their income in kind is probably of significance to the regional picture.
Aboriginal 'prosperity' in much of the Northern Territory, as in
northern Quebec, depends on a combination of cash and subsistence
income. Less clear in the Northern Territory context is the extent to
which patterns of settlement, and increases in the working-age population
relative to ecological productivity, limit the possibilities for increased
subsistence activity. Beyond income considerations, the homeland-
outstation movement clearly represents significant improvements in
health and quality of life, including renewed opportunities for self-
determination (Downing 1988). Furthermore, it is argued that indigenous
practices of resource use and management are needed to restore
economies to ecological sustainability in the tropical north and central
arid zone (Coombs 1990), a role that could repay public investment in a
more decentralised Aboriginal population.
Aboriginal organisation for regional development
Regional-scale organisations for self-government in central Australia,
even without the benefit of direct control of a significant share of central
government Aboriginal budgets as in northern Quebec, have begun to
develop some similar strategies. Important successes in coordinating the
development of air transportation, food warehousing and distribution,
road maintenance service and fuel distribution are reported for the
Ngaanyatjarra, in the Western Australia portion of the Pitjantjatjara
Council's region. The cultural homogeneity of their regional political
organisation has helped to commit scattered communities to regional
ventures of mutual benefit (pers. comm., Maureen Tehan).
Trends towards a more holistic range of political self-government
functions are also evident, both locally and regionally. Wolfe (1989: 175)
remarks:
Almost unnoticed NT Aboriginal communities have acquired a functional scope
which is unprecedented in communities of comparable size, managerial skill... or
experience with local government. This is the case regardless of whether the
community operates under the council and associations system or the NT
community government scheme.
Rowse (1991) describes the importance of Aboriginal-managed service
organisations, publicly subsidised and serving local clienteles, in political
mobilisation. There is a tendency for these service organisations to
redefine their mandates to address social issues holisticly, to apply
pressure and assert control in areas that go beyond their original
statutory/administrative raison d'etre, frequently in spite of concerted
opposition from state authorities.
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The regional land councils of the Northern Territory are considered by
Altman and Dillon (1988: 126) to be 'the most advanced and
comprehensive expression of Aboriginal self-government in the NT (and
for that matter anywhere in Australia)'. The land councils are
increasingly assuming 'para-governmental' functions, going beyond their
statutory role as agents for traditional owners of land to act as guardians
of broader Aboriginal interests, and to represent the views and
aspirations of Northern Territory Aborigines generally. As the
organisational size and effectiveness of land councils have increased,
relations with mainstream interests have become essentially 'inter-
governmental'.19
The receipt of royalty equivalent payments means that land councils have
substantial financial independence relative to most other government-
funded Aboriginal organisations.20 Like the compensation monies of the
Cree, moneys managed by land councils represent the single most
important source of independent finance. These have been used to
research and present land claim submissions to the Aboriginal Land
Commission, to negotiate resource development agreements, and to
mount effective opposition to the Northern Territory Government and
mining company lobbies.
Unlike Cree government entities, the land councils are fully dependent on
their own revenue for their activities. They have been arguing for base
budgets that would enable them to fulfil statutory functions without
dipping into royalty equivalent payments, which would in turn release a
higher proportion of royalties income for economic development. Only
the land councils, according to Altman and Dillon (1988), have sufficient
size and expertise to respond to many development opportunities on
behalf of Northern Territory Aborigines. Organisational differentiation
is needed to separate administrative functions from business risk
involvement.
Emergent regional entities are bound to face vexing issues of
representation in economic decision-making. Balancing the interests of
communities-at-large against those of traditional owners is difficult both
for land councils, and for the royalties associations which receive a
portion of revenues from specific mining developments on traditional
lands (Altman and Dillon 1988). The emphasis in ALRA is on traditional
ownership (rather than residentially-defined communities), reinforcing it
as a principle for receipt of financial benefits. By contrast, Cree 'hunting
bosses', who 'own' and manage territories damaged by hydroelectric
development, received no special rights to compensation monies or
monies paid in lieu of royalties received to the Cree under the JBNQA
(although hunters directly impacted benefit from certain local remedial
measures and limited forms of compensation).
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Nine Cree communities benefited from compensation paid under the
JBNQA, while Phase I hydroelectric development had a direct impact on
the lands and waters of only four of them.21 Compensation in lieu of
royalties was intended by the Government of Quebec as one element in an
agreement clearing the way for future phases of development that would
eventually impact all of the Cree communities. But the Cree argue that
they retain sufficient legal rights to block unwanted development, and
have so far been quite formidable in defending this position politically.
Meanwhile, the original compensation monies are managed regionally on
behalf of all JBNQA beneficiaries.
Both the cultural-linguistic homogeneity of the Cree, and the need to
make common cause against intrusive and geographically extensive
development plans, promoted relatively strong regional institutional
solidarity, although competition between local and regional leaderships
for authority and resources certainly does exist in various forms. But
investment stipulations for compensation monies under the JBNQA
(requiring, for example, that a significant percentage be invested
conservatively), the legal structures established by the JBNQA for
disbursing available revenue, and the political advantage of a regional
organisation in dealing with external governments, ensure the continued
viability and vitality of regional government.
It is an anthropological rule of thumb that new structures for
development should be coherent with existing social structure.
O'Faircheallaigh's (1986, 1988) analyses of Gagudju and Kunwinjku
royalty associations in the Northern Territory support the conclusion that
royalty associations are more effective when based on indigenous forms
of ownership. Ownership and associated kin relations were the basis for
constructive investments in enterprise and community infrastructure
development by the Gagudju Association, while the Kunwinjku
Association, whose members include three large communities without
common lands or kin ties, succumbed to infighting, and pressures to
maximise personal gains through disproportionate distributions to clans
and individuals.
While it is intuitively sensible to tie economic management to existing
socio-territorial arrangements, institutional innovation is nonetheless
required to overcome localism. Here, the evolution of a coherent
relationship between land councils and community self-government
structures in development planning and investment is key. Such evolution
cannot be taken for granted. Altman and Dillon (1988) fear that a
comprehensive system of community governments under Northern
Territory legislation could undermine the authority of both traditional
owners and land councils. Wolfe (1989: 173-4) finds 'little evidence of a
consistent agenda for greater Aboriginal self-determination ... on
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evidence of an agenda aimed at greater Aboriginal self-government of the
kind being sought, and in a few instances achieved by Aboriginal peoples
in Canada and the USA'. Wolfe concludes that in either existing option
for local government in the Northern Territory, incorporated community
councils with satellite housing and commercial enterprise associations, or
the 'community government' scheme offered under Northern Territory
legislation, local government is unduly subordinated to senior
government definitions.
While land councils have tended to broaden their political base and the
functions they serve for constituents, their statutory mandates limit their
ability to serve as comprehensive institutions of regional self-government.
What possibilities exist for accommodating the evolving capacities of such
organisations on the economic development scene? Altaian and Dillon
(1988) advocate greater land council control of ALRA's financial
provisions, the establishment of independent commercial arms, and
increased rates of saving while broadening constituent support.
Piecemeal 'self-management' via central government programs results in
a patchwork that duplicates the fragmentation, overlap and inefficiencies
of multi-agency involvement in Aboriginal affairs. True, the
proliferation of programs and administrators may increase room for
manoeuvre of the better-resourced and more effective Aboriginal
organisations (Altaian and Sanders 199la); but the factors accounting for
the latter's cohesive strategy are what one seeks to understand and
reinforce.
The new Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
regional councils are meant to combine Aboriginal representation with
more integrated decision-making in the administration of assistance
monies. A statutory responsibility of regional councils under the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 is 'to
formulate and revise from time to time a regional plan for improving the
economic, social and cultural status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander residents of the region'. Will momentum be stolen from regional
self-government structures that already enjoy a measure of legitimacy
with Aboriginal communities, or will the latter move effectively to secure
their own agendas and representatives on the new regional councils? Will
the Aboriginal Commissioners and regional councils have sufficient
autonomy from Commonwealth Government policies and administrative
procedures to be politically effective? Representation by statutory
requirement, while it may foster certain skills in dealing with government
bureaucracy, is the sort of approach to 'delegated' rights of self-
government that has been rejected by Aboriginal groups in Canada, in
favour of 'inherent', constitutionally-entrenched rights of self-
government.
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Consolidation and expansion of powers and claims to the resources of
existing regional structures of self-government, the land councils, the
Pitjantjatjara Council, the Torres Strait Island Coordinating Council, are
important opportunities in the context of constitutional renewal in
Australia (lull 199la, 1991b). In the setting of Canada's never-ending
constitutional negotiations, Aboriginals appear to be on the verge of
gaining recognition of Aboriginal government as a 'third order' of
constitutionally-empowered government, alongside federal and provincial
levels.
Conclusion
Three themes have been emphasised in this paper. First is the importance
of regional organisation. Cultural homogeneity facilitates the
development of regional polities, but broader definitions of Aboriginal
affinity that are not specific to clan or language grouping may serve as
well, if real benefits are to be had. This depends on Aboriginal perception
of a common interest, as well as structural opportunities for reform at the
state level.
A second theme is the importance of relatively comprehensive Aboriginal
government powers, interrelated powers that give local and regional
Aboriginal administrations, and the enterprises that they sponsor, greater
scope for employing their own people and for capturing economic spin-
offs between domains of financial input. While this potential is not
realised overnight, the initial indicators are positive in the James Bay
instance.
This relates, in turn, to a third theme, the importance of a holistic
conception of Aboriginal rights, not reduced merely to rights in real
estate, or to self-management of slender wedges of community
administration, but rather a conception that marries a spectrum of self-
government powers to real control over resources. For such complexes to
emerge, nation-states must lose the fear of surrendering substantial
control of resources and development agendas to Aboriginal polities. In
effect, circumstances must be fostered to improve the power of
Aboriginal leadership in state arenas, to get beyond the passive receipt of
policy largesse to command political spoils.
Notes
1. The Inuit and the Dene of the Northwest Territories (NWT), where Aboriginal
people form a political majority, enjoy some advantages compared with Cree and
Inuit in northern Quebec, both in regard to the extent of outright title to lands and
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resources that can be negotiated, and their influence through the NWT Legislative
Assembly on resource management policy.
2. An account of policy evolution in Australia can be found in Altman and Sanders
(1991a).
3. A registry is kept of all persons considered to be Indian under Canada's Indian Act,
hence, the term 'registered Indian', and the accuracy of figures for this population,
in comparison with unregistered or 'non-status' Indians and M6tis or 'mixed-
bloods'.
4. Employment rates expressed as the percentage employed of the working-age
population are a more accurate indicator than official unemployment rates. As Smith
(1991) shows, the restrictive definitions upon which official unemployment
statistics are based result in underestimation of Aboriginal unemployment rates.
5. This goal is regarded as unrealistic by some Australian specialists. See, for
example, Altman (1991b) and Altman and Sanders (1991b), who argue that the
deep-seated structural features which account for Aboriginal employment and
income status are intractable over the shorter term, and who caution against
reducing the notion of 'equity' to statistical equality in mainstream economic terms.
6. It is not clear how much of the $C873.7 million promised for the first half of the
1990s will be new money. The general perception is that total monies available for
Aboriginal economic development through federal government spending have been
in decline since the mid-1980s. There was a $C345 million Native Economic
Development Program, which ran from 1983 to 1989, but the government was
criticised for offsetting this program via cuts in funding previously available to
Aboriginals through such departments as Indian and Northern Affairs, Employment
and Immigration, and Regional Industrial Expansion.
7. These figures exclude registered Indians in the Northwest Territories and
Newfoundland. This increase in unemployment is related both to the deepening
economic recession toward the end of the period, and to the fact that in Canada, as
in Australia, the Aboriginal population is very young compared to the general
population, so that a growing proportion reached working age during the 1980s,
and will continue to do so during the 1990s.
8. Policy-makers recognise that 5,000 jobs per year need to be created to achieve a
level of 50 per cent employment among young Indian adults on reserves alone, and
that only a quarter of these jobs will be met by the Indian public administration
sector and other government supported jobs. Private or collective entrepreneurial
operations are the only prospect for an improved employment outlook. The federal
government hopes that the level of resources it is committing will attract additional
investment contributions from provincial and municipal governments, as well as
Aboriginal people. Also, by using a portion of funds in the development of a
network of Aboriginal financial institutions and capital corporations, business
development and employment creation are planned to be given an additional boost
over the longer term.
9. Canada's 1982 Constitution recognises and affirms 'existing Aboriginal rights',
which include treaty rights. For constitutional purposes, comprehensive claims
agreements are considered treaties.
10. Rowse (1991) discusses and critiques the recurrent theme among Australian
observers such as Howard (1981), Sansom (1982), and Eckermann (1988) that the
local, kin-anchored loyalties of small, culturally differentiated Aboriginal groups
impede political cohesion at more inclusive levels.
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11. A significant degree of Aboriginal political solidarity transcending cultural
distinctions does occur in provincial and national federations, associations and
assemblies. Generally, however, this effectiveness is at the level of putting pressure
on non-Aboriginal governments on constitutional and more general rights and
entitlements, not at the level of the practical functions of self-government.
12. LaRusic et al. (1990) caution that due to data limitations and methodology
employed, the unemployed category includes some ISP beneficiaries who held
seasonal jobs.
13. Percentages derived from figures in Table 6.
14. It has been suggested, however, that because the governing structures established
under the JBNQA assumed collectivity, room for individual action has been limited,
inhibiting the creation of small businesses (Robinson et al. 1989: 25). Our
knowledge of Cree use of personal savings in entrepreneurial investment is poorly
developed.
15. Altman and Daly (1992) find that agricultural and other private sector employment
has declined markedly for Australian Aborigines in general, while employment in
public sector industries, including the 'work-for-the-dole' CDEP scheme, has
increased markedly.
16. The Australian dollar was worth approximately $0.90 - 0.91 Canadian in 1987-88.
Obviously, extreme caution is required in interpreting the results of figures from
separate studies. Methodologies, as well as governments' accounting conventions,
differ. In both countries, however, it seems likely that Aboriginal-related
expenditures tend to be maximally represented, in the Canada/Quebec case because
it is in the interest of governments to show that transfers to JBNQA beneficiaries
are substantial; and in the central Australia case because the Combined Aboriginal
Organisations of Alice Springs were concerned to demonstrate that the regional
economy benefited substantially from central government expenditures on
Aborigines. Government of Quebec figures include some Hydro Quebec
expenditures that are in the nature of compensation to Aboriginal communities, and
therefore not in the nature of a routine annual expenditure. Some Ministry of
Finance expenditures in the form of recoverable loans to Aboriginalcommunities
are included. While these inclusions marginally inflate the total for 'annual'
government expenditures, the total does give an indication of cash economic in-
flows to the region.
17. Figures for Central Australia in Table 13 are similar to those for Northern Territory
Aborigines in general, at 26 per cent employed, 14 per cent unemployed, and 60
per cent of those of working age not in the labour force (Tesfaghiorghis 1991).
18. Notwithstanding their 'relative impoverishment', Simard (1992: 16) finds that,
taking into account the official 'poverty line' adjusted for rurality and family size,
the Cree and Inuit of Quebec, in general, were less poor than the majority of
Canadians, both prior to and following the James Bay project. Average disposable
Canadian family incomes have been moving closer to the poverty line since the mid-
1970s, although Cree and Inuit income status has dropped more quickly. The
surprisingly favourable income status of the Cree and Inuit in the early 1970s
depended heavily on subsistence income, but in the twenty years since has come to
depend increasingly on alternative economic development, as we have seen.
19. The most comprehensive reference on the functioning of royalty associations and
land councils, though now almost a decade old, is Altman (1983).
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20. In 1985-86, Aboriginal interests received $21.5 million in mining royalty equivalent
payments, about $8 million of which was distributed to Aboriginal associations and
communities (Altman and Dillon 1988: 134). On a territory-wide per capita basis,
these levels are lower than income on compensation monies administered by the
regional entities of the Cree and Inuit, but are increasing with new development.
21. 'Complementary' agreements resulted in significant payments to individual
settlements, but still these have not been distributed on the basis of traditional tenure
below the level of the community area.
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